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One of the foundations of military command and control is that authority must 
match responsibility.  Yet in weapon system acquisition, a program manager is 
responsible to deliver capabilities to the warfighter without full control of the resources 
he needs to carry out this task.  Successful program managers recognize their 
dependencies upon other actors and execute their programs using a network with a 
common goal of enhancing a specific warfighting capability.  A hierarchical chain of 
command still exists, but the network enables the actors to carry out their objectives in an 
efficient and effective manner.  This report describes how acquisition process purportedly 
works in hierarchical terms.  It also introduces a process model to describe the set of 
activities actually used and the actors who are required to collaborate to deliver 
capabilities to the warfighter.  The analysis of those activities between actors reveals that 
weapon system acquisition behaves like a network.  Describing acquisition in network 
terms allows those involved in weapon system acquisition oversight, policy, and practice 
to have a new insights and measurement tools to understand how to improve the weapon 
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Over one-hundred years ago, the Wright Brothers were the first to accomplish a 
manned, controlled, heavier-than-air-flight, making history at Kitty Hawk, North 
Carolina, on December 17, 1903.  How did two bicycle mechanics from Dayton, Ohio, 
accomplish this feat against a host of inventors?  And, why did the Wright's lose their 
advantage and not continue to make aviation history?  The answer to both questions 
revolves around their networks.  Early on, the Wright's were not only inventors, they 
were networked innovators.  Shulman concluded that their early success was due to their 
correspondence and sharing of ideas with Samuel Langley and flight historian Octave 
Chanute, who had built an extensive network within the aviation community (2002).  
Following their successful flight, however, the Wright's network was limited through 
secrecy that was driven by a desire to patent the airplane and secure a monopoly, even 
rejecting Chanute's request for information about their maiden flights (Shulman, 2002).  
The Wright's cut themselves off from their network, preferring to secure the patents 
rather than build upon their technological feat.  The loss of their network also led to 
stagnation in their innovation efforts.  Glenn Curtiss, on the other hand, was anything but 
secretive.  He and the Aerial Experiment Association built his June Bug aircraft and 
demonstrated flying to the public.  Eventually, Curtiss' collaborative network yielded the 
invention of 500 aviation devices, many of which are still in use today.  His factory 
invented and sold the flying boat to the Navy along with 6,000 JN-1 Jenny's, making 
Curtiss Aircraft one of the largest aircraft companies in the world (Shulman, 2002).  In 
essence, the duel between the Wright's and Curtiss proved that the success of complex 
projects is predicated upon the structure of the project's network of collaborators. 
Would Curtiss recognize today's billion-dollar weapon system programs with 
their high-stakes decision-making process ensuring that entrepreneurs do not waste 
precious taxpayer resources?  Or, has the world not changed that much…do successful 
programs still collaborate and network to successfully deliver capabilities to warfighters? 
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B. ACQUISITION PROCESS PROBLEMS 
Department of Defense (DoD) weapon system acquisition programs are plagued 
with performance shortfalls, and even more notably, cost and schedule overruns.  
Addressing this problem has spawned numerous studies and reforms over many years.  
Most recently, the push to reinvent government in the 1990s resulted in a series of 
reforms that led acquisition toward a market-based model.  Despite these efforts to 
improve efficiency, success has yet to be realized with several recent studies noting 
increasing cost and schedule overruns.  Civilian and military officials at the highest levels 
in the Pentagon have expressed frustration at the lack of balance among the competing 
interests of cost, schedule, and performance in weapon system acquisition programs.  
Given many stakeholders with multiple interests in the acquisition process and the 
inability of high-ranking officials to achieve a balance among competing interests, 
assigning a program manager responsibility for balancing cost, schedule, and 
performance appears to be a nearly impossible task. 
In addition to problems managing costs, schedule, and performance, warfighters 
are asking even more from their weapon systems, requiring capabilities that are joint, 
interoperable, and able to seamlessly share information.  Joint staffs are looking to gain 
an advantage on the battlefield based upon a revolution in military affairs driven by the 
explosion in information technology.  A weapon system program manager must manage 
not only her own baseline, but in addition rely on capabilities from other systems that are 
also in development. 
C. ALTERNATIVES TO ACQUISITION PROBLEMS 
With the many challenges of weapon system acquisition, there have been a series 
of changes to the acquisition process.  The number of congressional committees and the 
volumes of the authorizations and appropriations bills have exploded, often specifying 
exactly how to spend the appropriated money.  There have been many changes to the 
Federal Acquisition Regulations ensuring that contractors share information during 
negotiations, promoting competition, and leveraging commercial product development.  
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Within DoD, initiatives have included streamlining, flexibility, cooperative decision-
making, and more reliance on contractor best practices. 
All of these initiatives point toward three alternative ways to solve the acquisition 
problems: hierarchical control, market solutions, or network collaboration.  Powell 
(1990) concluded that hierarchies, markets, and networks are the three basic forms of 
organization.  Congressional and politically-appointed civilian control of the weapon 
system acquisition process makes one initially think of acquisition as a hierarchy.  
Indeed, the military chain of command and accountability structure within DoD makes 
this argument very plausible.  Alternatively, weapon system acquisition relies heavily on 
contractors who possess the know-how and resources to produce major weapon systems.  
A market-based solution to acquisition problems is also rational.  Networks, on the other 
hand, offer relationships that are built upon flexibility, thereby avoiding both the 
bureaucracy associated with hierarchies and the inability to internalize uncertainty 
associated with markets. 
The policy-makers and practitioners within the weapon system acquisition 
process do not typically think of the process in network terms.  Yet Powell (1990) 
concluded that networks are the predominant form of organization with a very few pure 
markets or hierarchies in existence.  This project is devoted to describing the acquisition 
process in network terms.  Therefore, the research question for this professional report is: 
• Does the DoD weapon system acquisition process behave as a network? 
The focus of this project is to understand how weapon system acquisition 
programs accomplish their objectives, and whether those interactions fit within the 
description of a network.  This analysis will offer a new perspective on the acquisition 
process. 
D. METHODOLOGY 
Chapter II describes the acquisition process and its interactions with both the 




balance alternative needs against fiscal constraints.  A process model will be introduced 
to describe the full set of activities and interactions a program must go through from 
concept to delivery and operation. 
With the activities of the acquisition process in mind, Chapter III highlights the 
characteristics of networks.  A definition of networks is established and aspects of 
networks are described from a review of literature.  Several network analysis techniques 
are coupled with a description of operating within networks, allowing an analysis of the 
acquisition process in network terms in Chapter IV. 
Finally, Chapter V offers conclusions to the basic research question of whether 
weapon system acquisition may be described in network terms.  Further, several 




II. WEAPON SYSTEM ACQUISITION PROCESS 
The Department of Defense (DoD) weapon system acquisition process must be 
described before it can be characterized as a hierarchy, network, or market.  This Chapter 
will describe the acquisition process and its interactions with other key processes.  To 
analyze these interactions, a detailed process model will be introduced that describes the 
activities and actors involved in transforming inputs into outputs in the form of 
knowledge and, ultimately, weapon systems. 
A. BACKGROUND 
The mission of defense acquisition is to deliver needed capabilities to warfighters.  
In the hands of warfighters, these capabilities are able to produce constructive effects on 
the battlefield.  The defense acquisition system is, in essence, developing the set of 
equipment that will be used to fight the next war.  The process of competing agencies 
collaborating to make these decisions is a very complex task that combines optimization 
of doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and 
facilities (DOTMLPF) solutions within the Joint Capabilities and Integration 
Development System (JCIDS).  Additionally, these decisions are dynamic, changing over 
time in response to environmental variables.  This results in changing desires and 
continuing debate over what is the best solution.   
Further, delivering materiel capability requires a complex set of actors, and even 
more stakeholders, who from markedly different perspectives seek to optimize the 
various processes of technology development, integration, test and evaluation, 
production, fielding, and sustainment of weapon systems.  Nevertheless, the governing 
directive within the DoD gives the Program Manager the purported authority and the 
clear responsibility to deliver required capabilities to the warfighter (DoD Directive 
5000.1:  2003).  Therefore, the Program Manager must find ways to shape the capability 
needs from the JCIDS requirements generation system; choose a design architecture, 
mature technologies, and develop an acquisition strategy within the Defense Acquisition 
System; and seek resources from the Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution 
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(PPBE) System.  These interactions are depicted in Figure 1 below.  Dynamic interaction 
among these systems is required to deliver a capability to the warfighter.  Kadish, et al 
described this interaction as the "Big A" acquisition process (2006).  This professional 
report will use this cross-cutting definition of the acquisition process.  
This chapter will highlight the key processes and interactions required to deliver a 
capability.  The JCIDS, Defense Acquisition System, and PPBE system will be briefly 
examined.  A process model will be introduced to highlight the depth and complexity of 
the interactions the acquisition process must perform to deliver a capability. 
Figure 1.   Process Interaction To Deliver Weapon Systems (Kadish, et al, 2006) 
                
1. Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS) 
The Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS) was born out 
of the perception that each service parochially examined alternatives within their own 
core competencies, rather than from the perspective of a joint warfighting environment.  
The Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 created a framework where Combatant Commanders 
(COCOMs) are responsible for joint operations and service secretaries and commanders 
are responsible to organize, train, and equip the military to conduct army, naval, and air 
operations in support of the combatant commanders (Public Law 99-433).  The 
Goldwater Nichols Act gave the COCOMs a significant voice in the funding process.   
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JCIDS essentially took the next step and institutionalized a process where requirements 
are jointly conceived, validated, and approved prior to each service implementing those 
needs. 
The other effect of JCIDS is to define capabilities gaps rather than threat-driven 
needs.  The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) defined capabilities as: 
The ability to achieve a desired effect under specified standards and 
conditions through combinations of means and ways to perform a set of 
tasks. It is defined by an operational user and expressed in broad 
operational terms in the format of a joint or initial capabilities document or 
a joint doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, 
personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF) change recommendation. (CJCSI 
3170.01E, 2005).  
a. JCIDS Process 
JCIDS specifies a series of analyses that must take place to shape the 
capability gap into a defined set of needs in the form of a sequence of Initial Capabilities 
Documents (ICD), Capabilities Development Documents (CDD), and Capabilities 
Production Documents (CPD) that provide the overarching definition of program 
performance required from each defense acquisition program.  JCIDS is comprised of 
four steps.  The Functional Area Analysis (FAA) produces a set of capabilities and their 
tasks and attributes. The Functional Needs Analysis analyzes the capabilities from the 
FAA and produces a list of capabilities gaps.  These results are documented in the Joint 
Capability Document (JCD) which the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) 
may review if it impacts joint warfighting.  The Functional Solution Analysis takes one 
capability gap and reviews materiel and non-materiel solutions resulting in potential 
approaches to satisfy that gap.  Finally, an independent team from the sponsoring 
command or agency reviews the results which are input into an Initial Capabilities 
Document (ICD) (CJCSM 3170.01B, 2005).  Figure 2 depicts the analysis process.   
b. JCIDS Pattern of Relationships 
The drivers of the JCIDS process are the representatives of the warfighting 
community.  The Combatant Commands own the Uniformed Joint Task List which is the 
basis for the Functional Area Analysis.  The Joint Staff oversees the process itself 
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initially through their eight Functional Capability Boards and then final JROC approval 
of the JCD and ICD.  The services’ requirements communities become involved as a 
sponsor of an approach that falls inside one of their warfighting core competencies. 
One difficulty in the JCIDS process is getting the services involved 
without corrupting the process by making it a forum for the each service to argue for their 
preferred approach.  JCIDS is supposed to avoid this problem through Joint Staff analysis 
of capability gaps identified by the Combatant Commands.  Should the services be 
relegated to a reactive role at the end of the process as the sponsor of the requirement, the 
funding agency, and the developer and integrator of the acquisition program? 
Figure 2.   JCIDS Analysis Process (CJSCM 3170.01B, 2005: A-2) 
 
 
Several presentations at the PEO/SYSCOM Conference in December 2003 
outlined what are essentially opposing views on the service's role during a panel on 
aligning JCIDS and the Defense Acquisition System.  Dr Glenn Lamartin, OSD(AT&L) 
Director of Defense Systems noted throughout his briefing that the new JCIDS and 
Acquisition policies had to be followed with collaborative relationships between OSD, 
the Functional Capabilities Boards, and the Services to support decision-making (2003).  
Dr. Nancy Spruill, OSD(AT&L) Director of Acquisition Resources and Analysis, 
supported a view that OSD ought to be the decision-maker in the process, holding cross-
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cutting Defense Acquisition Boards and either cutting or accelerating service programs to 
meet joint needs (2003).  Essentially, Dr Spruill viewed the services as materiel 
providers, who would react to OSD-defined solutions, whereas Dr Lamartin valued the 
services inputs to the joint architectures and decisions as a critical interdependency.  The 
right viewpoint is the one that recognizes how information is distributed.  If information 
that is needed for decision-making is distributed within the services and the combatant 
commands, the services ought to be involved.  If the Combatant Commands and Joint 
Staff have the information they need to derive alternatives that integrate with current 
warfighting systems and doctrine, then the services might be viewed as implementers of 
systems. 
c. JCIDS Realities 
As structured as the JCIDS process appears, the reality is that 
requirements change over time.  As technological possibilities and threat conditions 
change, so do the needs of the warfighter.  Within the acquisition community, this 
"requirements creep" may show up late in the acquisition process in the form of 
expectations or actual changes to written requirements.  JCIDS institutionalized this 
concept with the CPD, offering the opportunity for requirements changes just before 
entering low-rate initial production of an item (Matthews, 2004). 
Further, the expectations of the warfighter are often not met in a timely 
manner because their expectations evolve over time.  Without changing written 
requirements, the operational community may interpret what they previously stated in a 
requirements document differently over time.  For example, a system is tested against 
measures of effectiveness that are derived from Capability Development Documents.  
Another set of measures define the operational suitability of a system.  These allow some 
interpretation concerning how the system is used and employed given typical operational 
and maintenance personnel who help test the system during operational testing.  Dynamic 
interpretations of these measures have occasionally resulted in systems being declared 




2. Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution System 
The funding for the program comes through the PPBE process.  Every other year 
OSD issues budget guidance and the services begin a biannual cycle of preparing 
program objective memorandums (POM) to advocate their program's needs among other 
service priorities.  Eventually, the OSD comptroller and the Office of Management and 
Budget (OMB) prepare the defense portion of the President's Budget.  Even though 
Congress normally appropriates money for only each fiscal year, the POM for a program 
portrays the budget reflected in the Future Year Defense Program.  This, in essence, gives 
the budget community a forecast of what the budget will look like to satisfy spending 
priorities for the next several fiscal years. 
a. PPBE Function 
The Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution system is a 
centralized, structured way of allocating resources to support the National Security 
Strategy.  McCaffrey and Jones described the goal of PPBE as balancing forces, 
equipment, and support given resource constraints (2004).  Given the competitive nature 
of the services, this process allows the Secretary of Defense to balance competing 
objectives and select the most beneficial use of resources.  
The overlap of the planning, programming, budgeting, and execution 
phases, along with the multitude of disparate stakeholders, makes the system very 
complex.  Nonetheless, there is structure from the strategies of the planning phase, to the 
alternatives of the programming phase, the constraining of the budgeting phase, and 
finally, the execution phase where funds are appropriated, allocated, re-allocated, and 
expended.  The Air Force process is shown in Figure 3.  Lewis, et al. contend that the 
process is very much governed by modernization and basing plans since the Air Force 
emphasizes this portion of their budget.  Additionally, the process includes centralized 
planning and decentralized execution with the Major Commands (MAJCOMs) playing a 
key role as the interface with the COCOMs (2002).  Likewise, the Air Force centralized 
planning process interfaces with OSD and the joint staff to internalize changes in 
planning and other service priorities.  
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Figure 3.   Air Force PPBE Process (Lewis, Brown, Roll, 2002: 67) 
 
 
3. Defense Acquisition System 
The Defense Acquisition System refines concepts; matures technologies; develops 
and integrates system designs; and tests, produces, sustains, and disposes of weapon 
systems in response to warfighter needs.  The Department of Defense Directive (DODD 
5000.1, 2003: 3.2) governing weapon system acquisition defines an acquisition program 
as:  "a directed, funded effort that provides a new, improved, or continuing materiel, 
weapon or information system or service capability in response to an approved need." 
The direction comes in the form of responsibilities spelled out in a Program 
Management Directive.  This document spells out the high-level responsibilities of the 
sponsor (e.g., in the Air Force this would be a MAJCOM such as Air Combat 
Command), the System Program Office, and the responsible test organizations  
for developmental and operational test. 
The sponsor uses the JCIDS process as outlined above to define the need.  The 
interface with the acquisition community is through the Initial Capabilities Document.  
This input is refined in the concept refinement phase through the Analysis of Alternatives 
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process to select a materiel alternative that is cost and operationally effective.  The 
sponsor is responsible for the analysis of alternative using a collaborative process with 
the acquirer, developer, tester, and other enabling communities to refine the "art of the 
possible" (Air Force Instruction 63-101, 2005: 9). 
a. Acquisition Process 
The acquisition process uses a high-level framework as shown in Figure 4 
that serves as a common reference and set of expectations for all programs.  The reality is 
that every program is unique.  An infamous retort within the acquisition community when 
asked a general question about acquisition programs is "It depends."  The particular phase 
where a program enters the process depends upon the level of technological maturity.  
The strategy to exit that phase depends on the pre-defined expectations of the milestone 
decision authority.  This sounds simple, but who shapes the expectations of the milestone 
decision authority?  Certainly the operational, maintenance, sustainment, test, technology, 
and budget community, both within the service and at higher levels can influence the 
milestone decision authority's expectations. 





With multiple communities influencing the acquisition process, the 
Milestone Decision Authority (MDA) must have some way of sorting through these 
perspectives to make a decision.  One of the mantras of the updated DoD Directive 
5000.1 (2003: 4.3.1) is to supposedly provide program managers flexibility and lift the 
burden of regulations.  The first policy directive in the document states: 
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Flexibility. There is no one best way to structure an acquisition program to 
accomplish the objective of the Defense Acquisition System. MDAs and 
PMs shall tailor program strategies and oversight, including 
documentation of program information, acquisition phases, the timing and 
scope of decision reviews, and decision levels, to fit the particular 
conditions of that program, consistent with applicable laws and regulations 
and the time-sensitivity of the capability need. 
This directive appears to give managers and decision-makers the authority 
to develop tailored strategies based on value to the customer.  This may not be true, 
however, given oversight from the Service and Defense Acquisition Executive combined 
with necessary interfaces with the contracting, financial, and test and evaluation 
communities, whose regulations, policies, and culture may not allow a program manager 
to reject activities with less customer value.  The reality is weapon system acquisition 
process is a complex set of activities with few autonomous decision makers. 
Despite many interdependencies across the acquisition stakeholder 
community, DoD Directive 5000.1 names the milestone decision authority and program 
manager as key participants.  The milestone decision authority is given overall 
responsibility for the program, while the program manager is "the designated individual 
with the responsibility for and authority to meet program objectives." (2003).  The 
reality, however, is that the program manager must collaborate among many interests to 
accomplish program objectives.  Collaboration using integrated product teams (IPT) is 
the tool designated to resolve competing interests.  The collaborative process is not 
specified in detail, although DoD Directive 5000.1 (2003) lists the communities that 
ought to participate in collaborative decision-making and identifies the IPT as the entry 
point for organizations that want to collaborate.  The program manager and milestone 
decision authority use the IPTs' advice to make better decisions (DoD Directive 5000.1, 
2003). 
b. Multiple Outcomes from Many Stakeholders 
The Department of Defense weapon system acquisition process has been 
characterized as an effective but inefficient system, which has delivered preeminent 
warfighting capabilities while also routinely breaching cost and schedule constraints 
(Augustine: 2006).  The Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) highlighted this lack of 
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balance demanding that the defense acquisition system along with DoD's other support 
systems improve agility, flexibility, and horizontal integration.  The QDR lays out a 
vision where 1) the system is responsive to stakeholders as a steward of taxpayer dollars, 
2) information and analysis are available for timely decisions, and 3) efficient business 
processes reduce redundancy (2006).   
While the goals of any project are to meet customer cost, schedule, and 
performance goals, the acquisition system favors performance goals over cost and 
schedule goals.  General David Jones, retired Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
advocated changes to the acquisition and requirements systems after his retirement in 
1982.  He was frustrated with both his lack of control and the system’s resistance to 
change, noting that additional funding of needs is not the answer since “we get less 
capability than we should from our increased defense budgets” (1996: 24).  Norman 
Augustine, CEO of Martin Marietta and Chairman of the Defense Science board in 1983, 
agreed with Jones, empirically concluding weapon systems meet performance goals 70% 
of the time, while schedule and cost goals are met 15% and 10% of the time, respectively 
(Augustine and Fabini, 1983). 
McNutt focused on weapon system development and initial production 
cycle time including the causes of lengthening project schedules.  He surveyed 
Headquarters (HQ) USAF program element monitors, finding that 80% of projects had a 
need date of as soon as possible, while 20% had a need date in the future.  Current 
operational requirements gaps drove the need in 70% of programs (McNutt:1998).  Yet as 
shown in Figure 5, the development community rated performance and cost factors 
higher than schedule.  Correspondingly, when selecting a contractor, McNutt reported 
only 12% of program mangers listed product development time as a very important 
factor.  Not surprisingly, 60% of the contractors surveyed responded that they had no 
incentive to propose a schedule different than the expected schedule.  Likewise, program 
managers reported their incentive was to meet expected schedules, rather than exceed 
them (1998). 
The list of stakeholders within the acquisition process includes a variety of 
organizations with different expected outcomes.  The stakeholder list presupposes that 
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everyone in the organization supports the same outcomes.  Yet, even within 
organizations, individuals have projects that they value more than others.  A member on 
the House Armed Services Committee will behave differently than a member of the 
Senate Budget Committee.  Nonetheless, this generalization of stakeholders gives some 
idea of the variety of outcomes desired among the various actors. 





Congress plays a significant role in the acquisition process given their role 
in authorizing and appropriating funds for acquisition programs and overseeing those 
programs.  Article 1, Section 8 of the US Constitution vests Congress with the authority 
to: 
• Collect taxes to "provide for the common defence" 
• "To raise and support an Army" 
• "To provide and maintain a Navy" 
• Govern and regulate the land and naval forces 
Much of the work of Congress is done in committees, and acquisition 
funding and oversight work is no different.  The Armed Services Committees are 
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considered to be the acquisition experts in Congress.  They review military strategies and 
authorize weapon systems.  The appropriations committees, on the other hand, are 
generalists in Congress.  Although they fund specific weapon system programs, they are 
also concerned about other fiscal needs, such as the various entitlement programs.  
Finally, the budget committee is the most general of all.  They apportion budget amounts 
through a recommended budget resolution, and are concerned about balancing the budget 
as a whole.  Table 1 outlines the key House and Senate votes that affect acquisition 
programs. 
Table 1.   Congressional Votes on the Defense Budget (McCaffrey and Jones, 2004:  150) 

















Subcommittee  H, S H, S H, S H, S   
Full 
Committee 
H, S H, S H, S H, S H, S   
Floor H, S H, S H, S H, S H, S H, S H, S 
Conf. Rpt. 
Approval 
H, S H, S H, S H, S H, S H, S  
 
Congress is also involved in oversight of weapons systems.  Committees 
hear testimony on reforms to the acquisition process, on specific acquisition programs, 
and finally on the effectiveness of programs through an annual report from the Director 
of Operational Test and Evaluation.  Congress exercises its authority through the 
authorization and appropriations process, often changing the authorized quantity or the 
budget amounts for any given program.  They also pass laws and regulations, which 
govern the acquisition process such as the Federal Acquisition Regulations which specify 
how the Federal government contracts for all goods and services, including weapon 
systems. 
While Congress is not unified in the goals they seek, there are some 
characteristics of weapons systems that are typically desired.  Congress desires weapons 
systems that meet their early cost projections, penalizing those programs whose cost 
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grows 25% and therefore requires declaration of a Nunn-McCurdy cost breach.  These 
programs must be recertified may possibly be canceled in the process.  Congress also 
seeks effective weapon systems that demonstrate Congress' commitment to a strong 
national defense and to the protection of servicemen's lives.  Finally, elected 
representatives seek to support their districts and the constituencies who voted for them 
by maintaining and increasing DoD acquisition-related jobs in their states and districts.  
Congressman will, therefore, want to understand how a weapon system is impacting their 
districts.  They will seek possible job opportunities and funding for industry, universities, 
and military installations in their home districts. 
Office of Secretary of Defense 
The Office of Secretary of Defense is responsible to carry out the 
President's national military strategy.  In shaping the national military strategy, OSD is 
involved in both laying out a vision for national defense and in selecting the weapon 
systems that support this vision.  They author the Quadrennial Defense Review and the 
Budget Planning Guidance, which shapes the strategic thinking within the Pentagon.  
OSD also administers Program Budget Decisions (PBD) that dictate budget cuts to the 
services as they prepare the president's budget for the upcoming fiscal year. 
Another key stakeholder within the Office of the Secretary of Defense is 
the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics.  OSD/AT&L 
is specifically charged by the Secretary of Defense to carry out the modernization portion 
of the National Military Strategy.  This office carries out these responsibilities in two 
ways.  They are responsible for the DoD 5000 series regulations, which specify 
overarching policy for all acquisition programs.  OSD/AT&L is also the milestone 
decision authority for the largest and most costly acquisition programs. 
Military Services 
The Army, Navy, Marine, and Air Force services all play a key role in the 
acquisition process.  As in any hierarchy, there are specialists who oversee key pieces of 
the acquisition process.  Each service has logistics, budget, test and evaluation, 
requirements/operations, science and technology, and acquisition functions.  Each of 
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these functions plays key role in the acquisition process.  In recognizing the key role each 
function plays, the acquisition organization has adopted the Integrated Product and 
Process Development (IPPD) process to collaborate and integrate the knowledge each 
discipline brings to the acquisition process.  Figure 6 depicts a typical program office 
execution chain, highlighting the key roles each working-level IPT plays in advising the 
program manager.  The program manager also gains valuable information through 
interfaces with the contractor, depot, laboratories, Higher Headquarters staff, and 
MAJCOM sponsors.  
Figure 6.   Air Force Acquisition Organization 
 
 
What should be noted in Figure 6 is that the program manager has 
multiple chains of command.  For oversight and milestone decisions, the program 
manager must go up through the Overarching IPT (OIPT) and Defense Acquisition Board 
(DAB) to the MDA.  The DAB and OIPT, however, are composed of a host of high-level 
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representatives from across OSD and the joint staff, as shown in Figure 7.  Day-to-day 
management, however, is managed through the program executive officer (PEO) and Air 
Staff.  In fact, the PEO is the program manager's direct supervisor. 
 




The interactions on the program are much more complex than is depicted 
in Figure 6.  The Systems Engineering IPT interfaces with the sponsor command, the 
combatant commands, the national security agency, other systems with which the system 
must integrate, and finally the contractor that is developing the system.  The business 
management IPT interfaces with the contracting community at the center-level, Air Force 
Material Command-level, and Air Staff-level.  Likewise, the PPBE process requires the 
program to interface at the PEO-level and-Air Staff level with support from the sponsor 
command to secure funding.  The logistics IPT must work with the sponsor command 
logistics directorate that oversees organizational level maintenance and the Air Force 
Material Command logistics directorate that oversees depot-level maintenance to define 
the maintenance and support concepts for the system. 
Contractors 
DoD weapon system acquisition is distinct from other types of research 
and development in several ways.  First, DoD weapon system acquisition is a very large 
and complex business organization.  Fox contends DoD is the most complex business 
organization in the world, executing more than 60,000 contracts per day (1988).  While 
many businesses share complex interactions, Fox and Gansler point out key differences 
between DoD weapons acquisition and commercial enterprises.  Fox notes that in most 
industries, management is free to make decisions about strategies (e.g. product, 
production, quantity, distribution) being bound by a desire for profits.  Whereas in DoD, 
the government decides on the features of the product and the quantity, suppliers propose 
designs and promises of performance, and the supplier often holds a monopoly (1988).  
Gansler compares defense to either a regulated or planned economy.  Most regulated 
industries are regulated on the supply side, whereas DoD is regulated on the demand side.  
Also, DoD bears some resemblance to a planned economy where needs are dictated and 
the government owns facilities (1989).  Fox (1988) notes that DoD, unlike commercial 
enterprises, has always relied on industry to deliver needed technology and material and 
rarely owns and operates production facilities.  Given these differences, models 
empirically applied to private industry may not achieve the same results applied to the  
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DoD weapon system processes.  The unique nature of weapon systems requires models 
and empirical studies using DoD samples that account for the complexity and unique 
aspects of weapon system acquisition. 
Of course, contractors who support weapon system acquisition are still 
business entities and operate using business models that are modified for the 
monopsonistic, regulated weapon system acquisition environment.  The contractors are 
motivated for profits, return on investment, cash flow, market share, and future business.  
The difference in the weapon system acquisition environment is that the government 
dictates requirements and also bears most of the research and development cost to mature 
technologies and designs.  On the flip side, the government regulates the amount of profit 
that may be charged and attempts to ensure symmetric information through the Truth in 
Negotiations Act and cost accounting standards. 
c. Stakeholder Management 
Uncertainty during long acquisition development cycles and differing 
values within an organization the size of the DoD, leads to conflicts associated with the 
content and processes of an acquisition program.  The multitudes of organizations listed 
in Figure 10 have different agendas and bounded rationality.  How is the program 
manager to manage this conflict?  Colleen Preston in the OSD/AT&L Overarching IPT/ 
Working-level IPT (WIPT) Information Guide, depicted the issue resolution process as 
shown in Figure 8, where a program manager must elevate an issue to general officer-
level and even up to Component Acquisition Executive (CAE) or Defense Acquisition 
Executive (DAE) to resolve conflicts (1996).  The reality is that the program manager is 
better off managing issues at a much lower level before elevating them and spending the 
energy to resolve them among general officers and their staffs. 
To proactively address conflicts before they become issues, program 
managers may use an informal stakeholder management process.  Most managers might 
call this a risk management process, wherein they recognize the probability that an issue 
might impact cost, schedule, or performance.  Also, the program manager assesses the 
consequence of that issue transpiring.  Walking into a room full of high-level decision-
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makers without recognizing the issues that impact the program and who is driving those 
issues does not bode well for a program.  Rather, most program managers would avoid 
conflicts involving general officers.  Bryson (2004) suggested that public managers 
proactively formulated issues and organized coalitions to strategically resolve those 
issues, eventually resulting in redefinitions of organizations.  This does not suggest that 
issues will not come up as a program is going through a major decision review.  The 
reality, however, is that programs only go through major decisions every few years, and 
probably use a process similar to Figure 9 on a more routine basis. 
 




Figure 9.   Program Stakeholder Analysis (Bryson, 2004: 25) 
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Stakeholders' interactions, however, should be reviewed in a strategic 
context, since they may impact or be impacted by the program.  One of the four major 
findings of the Defense Science Board study on cost growth in space programs was that 
the government capability to manage programs had seriously eroded.  This erosion was 
partially due to program manager's inability to manage an expanding set of stakeholder 
needs on their programs, resulting in more requirements than the funding constraints on 
the program would allow (Young, 2003). 
B. WEAPON SYSTEM ACQUISITION PROCESS MODEL 
1. Purpose 
Given a plethora of the stakeholders and a complex product development process, 
the set of interactions required to manage a program need to be well understood.  
Describing the process to manage an acquisition program helps assess who interacts and 
how they interact to accomplish a program.  The Assistant Secretary of the Air Force 
(Acquisition Integration), SAF/AQX, formed the Acquisition Process Action Team 
(APAT) in Spring 2005 to describe the set of processes Air Force weapon systems were 
using to accomplish their missions.  The goals were to baseline the acquisition processes 
and form a common language and basis of measurement across the stakeholders in the 
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acquisition process.  The group focused mainly on the defense acquisition system itself 
and its interactions with JCIDS and PPBE. 
Lt. Col. Michael Paul and Major Ryan Mantz, SAF/AQXA, led the APAT effort.  
A group of consultants from the Center for Reengineering and Enabling Technologies 
(CRET) provided the methodology and manpower to support the data gathering effort.  
Mr. Mike Wilhelm, CRET, was instrumental in managing the effort. 
In order to assess the interactions within weapon system acquisition, the APAT 
used an enterprise process model approach.  A process model offers a look across the 
many disciplines within weapon system acquisition to understand what behaviors the 
team is using to solve the problem.  The model is put into process terms, where each step 
is defined as a verb-subject relationship.  Instead of describing a contracting/source  
 
selection process, the step is simply "Select Source."  This allows the team to focus on 
the stakeholders' inputs to the process instead of driving the description solely in 
contracting terms. 
Another important aspect of a process model is to describe the relationship 
between the steps and other actors.  In essence, the process model is a look at the 
interdependencies within the acquisition system.  Each step in the process is described in 
terms of inputs, outputs, triggers, and mechanisms.  A source of those characteristics is 
also described.  This allows the model to describe interaction with other steps in the 
process. 
2. Data Gathering 
The APAT team used the DoD 5000 series regulations as a jumping-off point.  
The major steps in the process were chosen as the high-level steps in the process.  This 
allowed the model to refer back to a reference to which acquisition, logistics, finance, 
contracting, test, and requirements personnel could relate.  Beginning with the high-level 
process, the APAT team held several workshops with a core group to decompose the 
high-level process into a series of lower-level process steps.  To ensure that the process 
model reflected the interactions across the Air Force acquisition process, the team set up 
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a series of workshops with acquisition personnel to refine the second-level of the model 
and develop the third and lower-levels of the model.  Each workshop lasted 
approximately two days and was focused on a particular phase of the acquisition process.  
The host base was selected from among those bases that focus on a particular phase.  For 
example, Warner-Robbins Air Force Base (AFB) was chosen as the host for the 
Operations and Support phase workshop, since they were heavily involved in depot-level 
maintenance.  Participants from all bases were invited, but the main, working-level 
participants were from the host base.  A series of workshops were held at the Pentagon, 
Eglin AFB, Warner-Robins AFB, and Wright-Patterson AFB.  Further, telephone 
conferences were held to refine the results. 
The robustness of the model comes from agreement among numerous individuals 
from different organizations and backgrounds that the set of steps described in the model 
were congruent with how they did business.  Over 120 people participated in the 
development of the model.  They came from Headquarters Air Force acquisition, 
logistics, and operations organizations.  Air Force Material Command, requirements, 
transformation, logistics, and engineering were also represented.  All four Air Force 
system centers are represented, along with all three depots.  Finally, Air Force Research 
Lab and Air Force Operational Test and Evaluation Center, along with the test wing at 
Eglin AFB had participants present. 
3. Results 
a. Overall 
The team used the following definitions as part of process decomposition 
effort, which match closely with the DoD Architecture Framework methods of describing 
functions: 
• Process – Logical set of steps transforming an input into an output 
• Inputs – Information or resource consumed in the activity to create 
the output 
• Outputs – Information produced by an activity 
• Suppliers – Who provides the input to the process? 
• Customers – Who receives the output of the process? 
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• Key Players – Who is ultimately responsible for the process being 
accomplished? 
• Controls – Business rules that govern the performance of an 
activity 
• Mechanisms – Resource that performs or supports an activity, but 
not consumed by the activity 
Unfortunately, there was not consensus agreement on all these parameters for every 
process.  The main focus was the process, inputs, and outputs.  Once the process was 
defined, an attempt was made to understand supplier, customer, key player, controls, and 
mechanisms data. 
Processes were decomposed into roughly five to seven sub-processes that 
were the key components of the higher-level process.  The workshop participants were 
instructed to keep decomposing processes until they were defined at an "actionable 
level."  In reality, the processes were decomposed until workshop participants could not 
agree on sub-processes that generally fit most programs. 
Appendix A depicts the output from the APAT effort.  There are five 
major processes as defined from the DoD 5000 series acquisition phases.  The APAT 
effort identified 27 process steps supporting those major processes. Beneath the major 
processes are 107 sub-processes with 172 supporting activities.  The workshop 
participants were more comfortable with the latter three phases of the acquisition process, 
rather than the first two.  Concept Refinement and Technology Development lacked as 
many sub-process and supporting activity steps upon which participants were able to 
agree. 
Even more important than the numbers of steps are the key players, 
suppliers, and customers of each process step.  To make the data more manageable for 
this report, key sub processes and supporting activities were chosen from those occurring 
in the Concept Refinement, Technology Development, and System Design and 
Development phases of the acquisition process.  While it was noted earlier that Concept 
Refinement and Technology Development were not as well-defined, these phases shape 
the definitions of the program and lock-in the design characteristics that affect cost 
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schedule and performance during the latter phases.  Therefore, this report focuses on 
these early phases of acquisition, where the characteristics of the weapon system are 
largely defined. 
b. Concept Refinement 
This phase marks the beginning of an acquisition effort.  Initial cadres of 
acquisition and requirements personnel begin to evaluate alternatives and define courses 
of action.  Based on these efforts, the acquisition lead identifies key technologies and 
acquisition strategies to begin to prepare for later acquisition phases. 
 
Table 2.   Concept Refinement Actors 
MAJCOM Requirements  (10) Industry (18) Center Contracting 
(PK) 
(3) AFMC  (11) Defense Intelligence 
Agency 
(19) Acquisition Center of 
Excellence 





(5) Milestone Decision 
Authority (MDA)  
(13) MAJCOM Budget (21) AF/TE 
(6) Federally Funded 
Research and Development 
Centers 
(14) SAF/AQ (22) DOT&E 
(7) Other Service Programs (15) SAF/FM (23) OSD  
(8) Joint Programs (16) AF/XP (24) AF  
(9) Allied Programs (17) Air Force Research Lab (25) Joint Staff 
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While this phase begins to explore acquisition strategies, the effort is not 
yet declared a program and does not have large funding associated with it.  Therefore, 
this phase is marked by heavy involvement between the MAJCOM sponsor and the 
acquisition lead.  Other key stakeholders, such as the Office of Secretary of Defense and 
Congress, may be peripherally involved at this point.  Similar programs within the 
service, joint, or allied community may view the program as either a complement or a 
threat to their programs.  Further, the budget, contracting, requirements, and test 
functions within the sponsoring MAJCOM and the acquisition community begin to get 
involved at this point.  The table below identifies the key players involved in the Concept 
Refinement phase.  The organizations named in Table 2 are either specified from the 
processes in Appendix A or implied based on documents needed for a Milestone A 
decision. 
c. Technology Development 
The purpose of the Technology Development phase is to sufficiently 
mature technologies so that they are able to be integrated into a system during the next 
phase of the acquisition process.  As one would expect, this phase is marked by heavy 
involvement with the research laboratory and industry communities.  Process 2.1.2, 
Identify Technologies for Maturation, and process 2.1.3, Define Technology Maturation 
Plan, describe the key interactions and processes required to plan the events of this phase 
of the acquisition life cycle. 
Table 3.   Technology Development Planning/Milestone Actors 
MAJCOM Requirements MAJCOM Logistics OSD/AT&L 
Lead Acquisition 
Organization 
AFMC Logistics Industry 
MDA SAF/AQX Defense Advanced 
Research Projects Agency  
AFMC/DO Center PK Government Laboratories 
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AF/TE DIA AF/XP 
DOT&E MAJCOM FM SAF/FM 
PEO SAF/AQ DAB/OIPT members (see 
Figure 7) 
OSD/NII COCOM  
 
For the purposes of this study, this phase was also chosen because 
Milestone B, which marks the exit of the Technology Development phase, is the first 
time that an acquisition effort must be declared a program.  Therefore, the other purpose 
of Technology Development is to build support for the acquisition program, so that it 
may go through a successful Milestone B decision.  The APAT effort described some of 
the key interactions that buildup to this decision point.  These interactions are depicted in 
Process 2.5 within Appendix A. 
The actors in the technology development phase are diverse, since they 
include those supporting specific technology efforts, as well as those evolving the 
requirements and readying the program for System Development and Demonstration.  
The actors performing technology work are joined through the lead acquisition 
organization to the requirements and oversight actors who are structuring the program as 
noted in Table 3. 
d. System Development and Demonstration 
An acquisition program in the System Development and Demonstration 
phase exhibits many interactions with oversight agencies, sponsoring commands, test, 
logistics, contracting, and engineering communities.  The program is now spending large 
amounts of research and development dollars and is moving towards requests for even 
larger amounts of procurement funds.  Stakeholders will mark the success or failure of a 
program at this point.  Certainly, the program manager manages interdependencies with 
other programs, resource providers, and decision-makers as shown in process 3.1 of 
Appendix A.  
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Another key process during this phase is to develop the detailed design as 
shown in process 3.2.3 in Appendix A.  This process involves highly-complex technical 
work, where the requirements that are allocated to the various portions of the system that 
must be integrated into a design.  The working level IPTs gain in-depth insight into 
contractor and subcontractor performance that the program manager must ensure is 
shared across working-level IPTs and incorporated into higher-level acquisition planning 
documents and interfaces.  The actors involved in these activities are noted in Table 4. 
 
 
Table 4.   System Development and Demonstration Management/Design Actors 
MAJCOM Requirements MAJCOM Logistics OSD/AT&L 
System Program Office AFMC Logistics Contractor 
MDA SAF/AQX Subcontractor 
Test Ranges Center PK Vendors 
Air Force Operational Test 




OSD (Comptroller) Congress SAF/FM 
PEO SAF/AQ MAJCOM FM 
COCOM Center FM Center Civil Engineering 
Center Human Resources   
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III. WHAT IS A NETWORK? 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Chapter II defines both how weapon system acquisition purportedly and actually 
behaves.  There is a defined, hierarchical chain of command with a Milestone Decision 
Authority and a program manager who is responsible for delivering a weapon system 
capability.  The APAT process study also revealed that the inputs required to deliver this 
capability require a set of stakeholder interactions that go outside the boundaries of the 
traditional chain of command.  Further, the stakeholders involved have differing and 
dynamic objectives causing both real and perceived instability within the acquisition 
process.  To address the question whether the defense acquisition system can be 
characterized as a network, one must first define networks and understand their basic 
properties.   
1. Markets, Hierarchies, and Networks 
The specialized support required for a project often conjures up images of 
hierarchical organizations that integrate these specialties together for a common purpose.  
Alternatively, a project might be accomplished through the marketplace where products 
and services are efficiently offered to those who have the highest willingness to pay.  
Ronald Coase’s early work on transaction costs compared firms and markets as 
alternatives to one another.  A firm integrated and organized resources when it was less 
costly compared with individual contracts in a market.  Coase theorized that the 
monopoly power gained and the decreased costs would encourage growth of firms.  Yet, 
he noted not everything was vertically integrated inside the firm.  The growth of the firm 
was balanced with the increasing expenses to organize a larger labor force due to 
diminishing marginal returns.  Eventually, the cost of an additional transaction within the 
firm was equal to the cost of contracting in the marketplace for the same goods or 
services (Coase, 1937). 
In addition to Coase’s description of why a marketplace and firm both exist, 
further refinements are necessary to understand the limits of markets and hierarchies.  
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Using a transaction cost framework, Williamson focused on the limitations that drive 
transactions out of the marketplace and the factors that limit the size of hierarchies.  
Markets are not efficient due to two factors:  limited abilities of the actor to process 
information (bounded rationality) and opportunism.  Transaction costs are essentially the 
factors which drive bounded rationality and opportunism.  Uncertainty or risk; lack of 
competition; and informational impacts due to incomplete information are the factors 
which drive transactions out of the marketplace in into hierarchical, vertically-integrated 
organizations (Williamson 1973).  On the other hand, the benefits of hierarchies over 
markets are limited due to coordination problems within the firm.  Williamson (1967) 
postulated that the coordination problem grows as the firm expands for two reasons:  the 
decision-maker is further removed from production workers and the breadth of 
information expands as new activities are added.  Certainly, Williamson and Coase laid 
out a workable framework to consider whether firms or markets are more efficient at 
carrying out production.  It is important to note that neither author considers markets and 
hierarchies in a continuum.  While Williamson (1973), briefly mentions peer groups, he 
largely dismissed this organization due to limitations from free-riders who do not 
contribute equally to the rest of the parties.  The transactional cost literature firmly 
described the factors that will shift production or services from a simple market to 
hierarchical forms of governance.  Yet, it failed to fully account for all of the other forms 
of governance that may exist between the market and the hierarchy.  
Powell introduced the concept that a network existed between a self-forming 
marketplace and a hierarchical organization.  He rejected the view that networks are 
neither part of a market-to-hierarchy continuum, nor do they represent a hybrid form of 
hierarchy.  As evidence, Powell offered two examples that pointed to the existence of 
networks.  He noted the blurring of the boundaries between markets and inter-
organizational collaborations, such at cooperative joint ventures.  The second example is 
the creation of enduring relationships between hierarchies and their consulting, law, and 




2. Review of Network Theory 
The literature offers the three parallel schools of thought on networks:  sociology 
developed social network theory, political science formed policy networks constructs, 
and public administration conceived public management networks (Berry, Brower, Choi, 
Goa, et al., 2004).  This chapter will synthesize definitions from all three disciplines as 
they apply to the research questions outlined in Chapter I.  Specifically, this literature 
review seeks to focus on the defining networks and their structure.  Also, the purpose of 
networks will be explored and compared with hierarchies and markets.  Finally, the 
literature on project networks will be examined to determine the key characteristics of 
this type of network as a framework in later chapters to examine the structure and 
behavior of weapon systems acquisition. 
B. DEFINING NETWORKS 
1. Why Network? 
Before delving into the definitions of a network, it is worth noting the inherent 
strengths and weaknesses each form of organization.  Markets are ideal for simple 
transactions where inputs and outputs are measurable and are not based on a number of 
contingencies.  Coase (1937: 287) described the marketplace as: "under no central 
control…supply is adjusted to demand, and production to consumption."  If an individual 
needs bread, he goes to the bakery and purchases it, exchanging money for ownership of 
the commodity.  If a community needs bread, a bakery must estimate how much bread 
the community will need.  Built into the price of each loaf is a measure of overhead that 
may contain some write-offs for the wasted bread that was not purchased due to 
variations in demand.  The market is still able to handle this degree of uncertainty 
through adjustments to supply and internalizing costs associated with uncertainty of 
demand within the price of the product. 
Hierarchies evolved to control the specialized inputs needed to produce complex 
products or services where the inputs may not be available in the commercial 
marketplace.  Coase (1937) used the classic example of specialized labor where a firm 
chose to employ an individual with specific skills rather than purchasing this person's 
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skills in a spot market where a price mechanism would ensure that person is used in the 
most beneficial manner.  This allows hierarchical firms to internalize the uncertainties 
associated with inputs.  Further, Williamson noted the inherent accountability associated 
with hierarchies.  A supervisor would be able to not only assess an employee's potential 
in advance and set a wage, but observe that persons work on the job and make 
adjustments (1973).  Therefore, hierarchies excel when inputs have uncertainty, since 
they allow internal observation and adjustment during the course of business. 
Networks are adept at handling uncertainty associated with both inputs and 
outputs.  O'Toole (1997) described this as wicked problems that cannot be divided into 
tasks that are isolated from each other.  Powell agreed that networks form as 
organizations choose to pool resources to manage uncertainties, thereby creating 
interdependencies from which a firm cannot easily walk away.  He elaborated that 
networks are particularly adept at exchanging resources that are difficult to measure, such 
as "know-how, technological capability, a particular approach or style of 
production."(1990:  304) 
2. Network Definition 
While a network is fairly well understood in today’s society, the familiarity with 
networks may lead to a variety of definitions.  Several definitions from social networks, 
public policy networks, and organizational networks will be examined.  The examination 
will allow a common definition of a network.  These definitions will allow a further 
examination of how networks are structured and what their purpose is. 
The most straight forward definition of a network comes from sociology.  
Borgatti and Foster (2003: 992) described this type of governance as, “A network is a set 
of actors connected by a set of ties.”  A network may be two or more actors, but a 
network is different than a crowd of people walking down a street who have no 
interaction or ties with one another.  Marsden and Lin (1982) and Knoke and Kuklinski 
(1991) emphasized persistent relationships among actors, focusing on their relationships 




continues to exist apart from the network, a network does not exist without the 
relationship between the actors.  Figure 10 depicts a simple network consisting of two 
actors with some defined relationship.  
Figure 10.   Simple Dyadic Network 
Actor A Actor BRelationship
 
 
While the actors may have attributes (tall, wealthy, Latino, government defense 
contractor, etc), they will retain these attributes whether or not they remain within the 
network.  Knoke and Kuklinski concluded that the actor’s attributes are the context 
within which the actors define their relationship with other actors to form the network.  
They surveyed the literature to understand the types of relationships studied in network 
analysis as shown in Table 5 (1999). 
Table 5.     Types of Network Relationships (Knoke and Kuklinski, 1991)  
Type of Relationship Content of Relationship 
Transaction relations Exchanges to control assets or media 
Communication relations Information sharing 
Boundary penetration relations Common constituents 
Instrumental relations Contact other actors to seek sources for 
goods, services, or information 
Sentiment relations Seek others to express feelings 
Authority/power relations Right and authority to command 
Kinship/descent relations Role of family members 
 
Another key part of aspect of a network is structure.  While an actor may have 
some type of relationship with others, Granovetter realized that networks are not centered 
on one actor but include influences from the relationships of the other actors. He 
theorized that within a network there were strong and weak ties, depending on the time, 
energy, and trust in the relationship.  As depicted in Figure 11, if actor A has a strong tie 
with actor D, actor D’s other strong ties will automatically be weak ties with actor A (e.g. 
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Actor E and Actor F’s relationship with Actor A).  Granovetter’s realized that the weak 
ties were actually the bridges of information, bringing new and innovative information 
from disparate parts of the network (1973). 












Another example of networks comes from the field of public administration 
where networks are used among government, non-government, and private agencies.  
Kickert, Klijn, and Koppenjan (1997: 6) described networks as “stable patterns of social 
relations between interdependent actors, which take shape around policy problems and/or 
policy programmes.”  This definition is broad, spanning coalitions of intergovernmental 
and non-governmental actors organized around both issues and delivery of public goods 
and services.  Mandell (1988) defined a network as “linking of a diverse number of 
organizations and/or individuals into a purposive whole.”  Her definition is useful for 
public administration since this field looks to provide a public good from which 
communities benefit and that individuals may enjoy without a clear means of measuring 
their demand for the good.  A network in this context may be a public, non-governmental, 
and private partnership that is focused on providing some public good or service. 
One difficulty that arises is that Mandell (1988) and O’Toole (1997) added to 
their definitions a qualification that organizations that make up the network must be 
independent, even going as far as suggesting that the organizations must be legally 
distinct or from different levels of government.  This stems from their attempt to define 
networks separately from hierarchies.  They failed to recognize that large organizations 
are not issue or product-specific.  Actors within the organization may value outcomes 
differently or perceive the risk associated with processes in a variety of ways.  Kickert, et 
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al. (1997) viewed that networks are an extension of the limitations of single decision-
makers due to bounded rationality and the process approach where many decision-
makers, both within and outside the hierarchy, seek solutions for their problems. 
Before choosing one definition over the others, a review of their similar 
characteristics reveals that all the definitions explicitly or implicitly allow two or more 
actors with a focus on the relationships between the actors.  Sociology delves into the 
purpose, strength, and structure of the network.  These social networks can cover many 
types of relationships, allowing use of their definitions and research among the many 
purposes of social networks.  The examples of networks in policy and public 
administration often include long-term programs and, therefore, contain permanent, 
lasting relationships.  This report will utilize the Kickert, et al. (1997) definition of 
networks where actors are dependent upon one another; there are lasting, stable 
relationships; and the network is formed around a policy or project.  In comparing this 
definition with others, Klijn (1997) identified three characteristics of networks: 
• Networks form due to interdependencies between actors. 
• Networks consist of multiple actors who have their own objectives. 
• Networks consist of the lasting relationships between the various actors. 
The first condition for a network is interdependencies.  Klijn (1997) suggested 
resource dependency is a key driver of lasting relationships since organizations set goals 
which require exchange of capital, personnel, and knowledge with other organizations.  
Further, he pointed out that dependencies are dynamic in a network, so they were difficult 
to classify.  Powell (1990) and Jones, Hesterly, and Borgatti (1997) similarly emphasized 
actors within networks performing complex exchanges and transactions using trust and 
norms rather than simple, market-driven, legally-enforceable contracts.  
Again, the condition for more than one actor comes into the definition with the 
added criteria that each has their own objectives.  Scharpf (1978) concluded that within  
government there is no single actor and no unifying goal.  Instead, policy was a result of 
interactions among multiple actors where coordination is achieved through exchanges of 
material, information, and legitimacy. 
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The final characteristic of networks is that they are composed of lasting 
relationships among the actors.  Klijn (1997) and Jones, et al. (1997) concluded that 
relationship patterns in a network are defined according to their frequency over time.  
Repeated interactions strengthen the relationship.  As a pattern of behavior develops 
during on-going interactions, actors will begin to understand who they can trust and who 
they cannot trust.  Therefore, the basis for the network is the willingness to establish 
interdependency based on that frequent, lasting relationship. 
C. NETWORK ANALYSIS 
1. Introduction 
Is managing within a network the same as managing in a market or hierarchy?  
Intuitively, the answer is no.  A purely market transaction relies on the same information 
between buyer and seller to carry out simple transactions.  Management in markets 
consists of ways to build knowledge of the opportunities in the marketplace or to speed 
transactions.  Management in hierarchies consists of breaking down tasks and applying 
specialized skills to those tasks.  Management in networks, with their lasting relationships 
and lack of centralized control, requires a different set of skills to gather information and 
apply resources to solve a problem.   
Armed with a definition of a network, the next challenge is to understand how to 
operate in a network setting.  An understanding of the network itself must preface any 
attempt to develop a strategy to achieve objectives in a network setting.  Understanding 
the boundaries of the network, the power structure based on relationships, and the 
persistence of networks are all critical to derive some a strategy for operations within a 
network setting. 
2. Network Boundaries 
The first task is to understand the unit of analysis within a network.  Aldrich 
(1982) concluded that a network ought to be the level of analysis, since transactions 
cannot be viewed as simple transactions between two parties.  Transactions must be 
viewed from the perspective of the network as a whole.  The boundary conditions, 
therefore, become an important characteristic of how the network operates.   
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A network implies exclusivity where members of the network are choosing to 
deal with one another rather than those beyond the network.  Aldrich turned to 
transaction cost economics to determine the boundaries.  Transaction cost economics 
dictate that infrequent transactions would drive actors to make few transaction-specific 
investments, whereas a network consists of actors making frequent transactions using 
transaction specific investments (1982).   
This explanation ties in nicely with the Kickert, et al. (1997) definition of 
networks where interdependent actors have lasting relationships formed around a policy 
or project.  Actors who are within the network and interacting frequently with one 
another would make transaction-specific investments thus strengthening their 
interdependency on one another within the network.  Wal-Mart’s supply chain 
management techniques with its supplier network provide an illustration of 
interdependency based on transaction-specific investment.  Wal-Mart’s strategy to offer 
low-cost, brand-name products is based not upon procuring the cheapest products.  
Instead, Wal-Mart works closely with its suppliers to reduce the transaction cost in the 
supply chain.  Who is in Wal-Mart’s network?  Those suppliers willing to make specific 
investments in information technologies such as electronic data interchange and pallets 
with radio frequency identification devices that helps both Wal-Mart and their suppliers 
jointly manage their overall supply chain efficiently (Zimmerman, 2003). 
3. Network Structure 
In analyzing a network, the individuals within the network are not as important as 
the relationships between the actors within the network.  Since networks imply 
interactions where no one individual has all the resources to solve a problem, the dyadic 
relationship is the basic unit of structure.  At the next higher level of analysis, the 
network as a whole will determine the success of outcomes.  How the dyadic 
relationships are arranged to form a network count in achieving a result.  Therefore, 
structure determines how the group as a whole will perform. 
The relationships themselves within the network could be characterized as strong 
or weak.  Granovetter (1973) introduced this concept with his strength of weak ties 
theory.  Measures of the strength of the tie include information capacity of the tie, rate of 
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information flow, probability of transmitting information, and frequency of interaction 
(Borgatti, 2002).  As the network scales up adding more actors, the average distance 
between the actors may increase.  Distance is measured as the minimum number of links 
through various nodes to connect two actors in a network (Knoke, 1990). 
While strong and weak ties help to characterize the reality that not all ties are 
equal, another measure might be the diversity of information received from the tie.  Burt 
(1983) introduced the concept of range to measure the diversity of actors and information 
within a network.  Using a ego network, Burt explained that there are four measures of 
range:  1)  the number of relationships for any given actor, 2) the number of status groups 
(occupation, age, sex, etc) in contact with the actor, 3) the weakness of ties with very 
dense, non-diverse status groups, and 4) the weakness of ties with actors who have strong 
ties with others in ego's network.  Basically, to enhance the quality of their contacts, an 
actor would like to have relationships with many actors from different social groups. 
The connectivity of the network as a whole may be measured various ways.  A 
component is the portion of a network where nodes can reach every other node using 
some path (Borgatti, 2002).  A network that is completely connected has one component, 
whereas one that has disconnections will contain more than one component.  This 
fragmentation of a network implies that the network will not share resources completely 
across the network. 
How many dyadic relationships exist within the network is another important 
concept describing connections within the network.  Of course, the number of 
relationships is an absolute measure and depends on the number of actors within the 
network.  The accepted measure within the social network analysis community is 
network density.  Knoke (1990) defined density as the number of actual links in a 
network divided by the number of possible ties between nodes.  The following equation 
defines density: 
Density = T / N(N-1) 
where T is actual number of ties and N is the number of nodes 
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For a 15-actor network where there are two-way or directed ties, the number of possible 
ties is 210.  If there are 40 ties in the network, the density of the network is 0.19. 
Density is also useful to assess subgroups within a network.  Portions of the 
network where actors are connected to every other actor are defined as cliques, whereas 
social circles may have less frequency or bi-directional contact (Knoke and Kuklinski, 
1991).  Therefore, a subgroup with a density close to 1.0 is a clique.  The strength of the 
ties and number of communication channels implies that this clique will completely share 
information. 
To illustrate the concepts of measuring information flow in a network, a 
hypothetical example of a network where actors exchange information asymmetrically is 
shown in Figure 12 below: 











The arrows depict the flow of information, some of which is bi-directional, while several 
actors receive information but do not transmit information back to the other actor in the 
dyad.  An adjacency matrix is used to represent this information flow from actors to one 
another.  The number one in a row represents transmitting information from the actor in 
the row to the actor in the column, whereas a zero indicates that no information is 
transmitted.  The number one in a column represents receipt of information, and, of 
course, a zero represents no information receipt.  Knoke (1990) developed the following 
matrix in Table 6, concluding from the totals for the columns and rows that A receives 
the information from more sources, and E transmits information to the most actors. 
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Table 6.   Matrix Representation of an Asymmetric Network (Knoke, 1990: 237) 
 A B C D E F G H I J Total
A  0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
B 1  1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 
C 1 1  1 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 
D 1 1 1  0 0 0 0 0 0 3 
E 1 0 0 0  1 1 1 0 0 4 
F 0 0 0 0 1  0 0 0 0 1 
G 0 0 0 0 1 0  0 0 0 1 
H 0 0 0 0 1 0 0  0 0 1 
I 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0  0 1 
J 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  0 
Total 4 2 2 2 4 1 2 1 0 0 18 
 
4. Actors’ Positions within the Network 
Switching from the network back to the individual actor as a unit of analysis, the 
above tools also allow an assessment of how the actor fits into the structure of the 
network.  Since structure matters in carrying out the purpose of the network and some 
positions in the network receive and transmit more information than others, what 
conclusions may be drawn from these observations? 
First, measures of actor's positions in the network will help to infer a power 
structure based on the structural relationships.  Freeman (1977) introduced measures of a 
node's centrality based on his definition of position centrality:  "the degree they stand 
between others, and can therefore facilitate, impede or bias the transmission of 
messages."  These nodes control the information flow in the network more than others.  
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The measures for centrality were based on examining the probability a given point is a 
path of communication given all the possible points between all the possible dyads within 
a network, the relative measure of centrality comparing a point to all other points, and the 
dominance of centrality comparing the relative measure to those of all other points 
(Freeman, 1977).  A star-shaped network, for example, has a central hub that is along all 
communication paths between other points.  The other points are not along 
communication paths to any other points.  The hub has a relative measure of centrality of 
1.0 and the network also has a centrality value of 1.0, since all communication within the 
network must pass through the hub. 
Centrality appears to be directly correlated with the efficiency of the network and 
the power of the individual who is more central.  Freeman (1977) applied centrality 
measures to other studies of communication in small group settings, and concluded that 
centrality was related to solving problems with speed and efficiency and personal 
satisfaction.  Likewise, Krackhardt's (1990) work correlated Freeman's measures of 
centrality to perceived power in a small, entrepreneurial organization. 
5. Relating Network Structure to Network Effectiveness 
While measures of network analysis are interesting, they are of little value unless 
some empirical data is offered that relates these measures to better outcomes.  Before 
explicitly answering that question, one must consider that the above models could be 
applied to either markets or hierarchies.  Certainly, a pure hierarchy will have bi-
directional interactions, but virtually no density within the information flow until it 
passes up the chain of command is filtered and then disseminated to appropriate divisions 
across the organization.  Intuitively, this low-density set of hierarchical relationships 
would not disseminate information as quickly or thoroughly as a network.  One would 
expect to find more density in a network setting along with lower average distance 
between nodes.  Measures of range would probably differ the most in a network 
compared to a hierarchy.  The contacts in a network would be much more diverse than 
one would find as a manager in a hierarchy using the formal chain of command. 
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Table 7.   Network Effectiveness Criteria (Provan and Milward, 2001: 416) 
Levels of 
Network Analysis 
Key Stakeholder Groups Effectiveness Criteria 
Community Principals and Clients 
Client advocacy groups 
• Funders 
• Politicians/Regulators
• General Public 
• Cost to community 
• Building social capital 
• Perceptions that problem is being solved 
• Changes in the incidence of problem 
• Aggregate indicators of client well-being 
Network Principals and Agents 







• Network membership growth 
• Range of services provided 
• Absence of service duplication 
• Creation and maintenance of network 
maintenance organization 
• Integration/coordination of services 
• Cost of network maintenance 
• Member commitment to network goals 
Organization/Parti
cipant 
Agents and Clients 
• Member agency 
board and 
management 
• Agency staff 
• Individual clients 
 
• Agency survival 
• Enhanced legitimacy 
• Resource acquisition 
• Cost of services 
• Service access 
• Client outcomes 
• Minimize conflict across networks 
 
From the perspective of the network as a whole, a definition of network 
effectiveness must be defined on multiple levels across multiple agencies.  Provan and 
Milward (2001) offer the community, or area the network serves; the network itself; and 
the organization and participants as the levels among which a network should be  
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evaluated to satisfy multiple stakeholder perspectives.  Table 7 offers a comparison of the 
levels, the stakeholders, and corresponding criteria which may be used to evaluate a 
network. 
Despite this multiple combination of stakeholders and criteria, some conclusions 
may be drawn from empirical studies.  Provan and Milward (1995) assessed local mental 
health networks in multiple cities drawing four conclusions on the effectiveness of those 
networks at improving client outcomes using multiple levels of data collection (i.e. 
clients, families, and case managers).  In measuring the characteristics of those networks 
and the resultant outcomes, Provan and Milward (1995) developed the following 
conclusions: 
• Networks are more effective when they are integrated through 
centralization, although networks that are integrated through a core agency 
and integrated through dense links among members will be less effective 
than those are integrated through a core agency alone. 
• Networks are most effective when external controls are directly applied, 
rather than applied through an agency. 
• Networks are most effective when a degree of stability is achieved, 
especially when the stability and uncertainty impacts clients. 
• When the above conditions are optimal, resource scarcity will limit the 
effectiveness of the network.  Conversely, resource abundance allows the 
network to range from low to high effectiveness, depending on the 
conditions above. 
D. STRATEGIES FOR OPERATING IN A NETWORK 
Given some of the notable differences between hierarchies and networks, it 
should not be a great surprise that operating in a network is different than operating in 
either a market or hierarchy.  Many authors agree that operations in network settings 
require different strategies than operations in hierarchical organizations (Agranoff and 
McGuire, 2001) (Mandell and Steelman, 2003) (Mandell, 2000 and 1990) (Kickert, et al., 
1997).  In markets, actors coordinate based on a set of independent choices they have 
previously made, whereas hierarchies coordinate based on central authority, rules, and 
collective goals (Kickert and Koppenjan, 1997).  Networks, with their interdependent 
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relationships, behave as neither an independent market nor a centralized hierarchy.  The 
differences result from both limitations and opportunities that only exist in networks. 
1. Network Governance 
Network structures are fundamentally different than hierarchical structures.  
Mandell (2000) pointed out that the power and authority structure, interdependent 
members, and lack of boundary conditions cause different management characteristics in 
networks.  Networks lack a formal authority structure, since members do not give up 
authority (Mandell, 2000).  Members may choose to not fully invest or under-invest 
resources in the network.  Members may pass along all or only some information.  
Ultimately, members may even choose to exit the network, although interdependency 
suggests that this will not happen in the short run.  Nonetheless, these examples illustrate 
that members in networks have choices to make.   
Given multiple sets of organizations with multiple values, the tradeoffs within a 
network become very complex.  In Managing to Collaborate, Huxham and Vangen 
concluded that collaboration, organization, and individuals all have explicit, implicit, and 
hidden aims.  The perceptions of what collaborative purposes each organization seeks 
must be negotiated across the network and over time to define the purpose of the network 
(2005).  Two ideas emerge from this multiple stakeholders' value arrangement:  1) 
defining what values lead to measures of effectiveness and efficiency (i.e. quantitative or 
qualitative views of outcomes) must be done at the network level, and 2) improving the 
network's outcomes requires governance across the network. 
One could debate whether management in a network is even possible.  A better 
description of operations in a network may be governance rather than management.  
Mandell (1990: 32-33) argued that a manager in a network may "marshal forces," but she 
clearly asserted that each actor in the network "potentially has equal power."  Governance 
in a network is, therefore, collaborative rather than directive or coercive in nature.  If one 
actor wants to further some outcome she values, first she must get others to agree to go in 
that direction.  Kickert and Koppenjan (1997) suggest two sets of behaviors to improve a 
desired outcome:  guiding interaction processes within the network and altering the 
characteristics of the network. 
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2. Guiding Interaction within a Network 
Governing a network involves changing a set of conditions upon which the 
relationships in the network are built.  Since the outcomes in the network are dependent 
upon multiple organizations, pursuing one organization's value judgments does not mean 
that the network as a whole will be more effective or efficient.  The actors within the 
network, however, can pursue relationships within the network that will affect outcomes. 
a. Activating the Network 
The first activity Kickert and Koppenjan (1997) suggested was to activate 
portions of the network that may lead to solving certain problems or achieving certain 
goals that are within the overall aims of the network population.  Since networks often 
have multiple purposes, selecting actors that are likely to want to invest resources into the 
particular purpose is a critical part of this activity (Scharpf, 1978).  All complex networks 
lack a complete set of relationships between all actors due to the energy involved in 
maintaining those relationships.  Activating the network involves building the density of 
the network so that organizations that have common purposes may begin to work 
together. 
b. Arranging Interaction 
The risk that other actors will not deliver on their commitments is a 
characteristic of networks whose actors are interdependent.  These risks may include 
underinvestment in public goods within the network (i.e. free rider behaviors) or exiting 
relationships before outcomes are achieved.  Arranging interactions is essentially taking 
steps to minimize the risk of uncooperative behavior through informal and formal rules 
with specific actors who are essential to a valued outcome (Kickert and Koppenjan, 
1997). 
c. Brokerage 
Complex networks with many participants and multiple aims may have 
participants who have not connected with one another.  A broker may act as a go-between 
(Mandell, 1990), raising problems and solutions that bring these disparate actors together 
for a common purpose (Kickert and Koppenjan, 1997).  Mandell suggested three types of 
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brokering behaviors:  1) the orchestra leader who gives directives to followers, 2) the 
laissez-faire leader who ensures parties come together but is not involved in the ensuing 
relationship, and 3) the producer who has a role in the outcome and actively participates 
as a leader (1990). 
d. Facilitation 
This type of strategic behavior in a network sets the stage for actors in the 
network to explore others ideas.  Kickert and Koppenjan (1997) described this strategic 
behavior as procedural behaviors aimed at understanding the range of ideas across the 
actors within the network to enhance joint problem solving.  Innes and Booher describe 
this process as consensus building which strategically generates first, second, and third 
order effects.  These include building social, intellectual, and political capital; generating 
high quality agreements; and fostering innovative strategies.  Second and third order 
effects include generating new partnerships and collaborations, joint learning, and even 
new norms (1999). 
e. Mediation and Arbitration 
While some of the processes may be similar to facilitation, the existence 
of conflict defines when mediation and arbitration are necessary.  Mediation allows a 
neutral party to bring the differing actors together to discuss differences, where the 
responsibility for resolution remains with the parties to the conflict (Kickert and 
Koppenjan, 1997).  Arbitration is when a neutral, third party imposes an outcome, 
thereby, removing the responsibility for conflict resolution from the parties (Kickert and 
Koppenjan, 1997). 
3. Network (Re)Structuring 
Network structuring may be more akin to what is traditionally thought of as 
strategic management in hierarchical organizations.  These activities change some of the 
fundamental perceptions about what the purpose of the network is and how it is 
structured to relate to its environment.  The difficulty within the network is to get 
agreement across the network to agree to a fundamental shift in network structure.  Since  
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network power is shared, theorists do not agree on the efficacy of these methods.  
Nonetheless, there are some techniques that may be used to influence all of the 
interactions across the network. 
a. Cognitive Interactions 
An actor within the network may attempt to change the perception of 
actors within the network.  Termeer and Koppenjan examined techniques to develop 
common language, prevent the exclusion of ideas, introduce new ideas, and reframe ideas 
as ways to manage perceptions to directly influence actors in the network.  These 
methods pursue a goal of a coalition through the creation of variations in thought within 
the network (1997).  Ultimately new ideas and ways of thinking will pull the entire 
network in new directions. 
b. Social Interactions 
Another way to influence the relationships across the network is to 
influence how the actors interact with one another.  Development of new procedures, 
preventing the exclusion of actors, or introducing new actors may influence may affect 
how the actors interact with one another (Termeer and Koppenjan, 1997).  An example of 
this would be to activate a relationship to an actor that a broker is suppressing.  Going 
outside the broker relationship may encourage other actors to seek information directly 


























A. APPLICATION OF THE NETWORK PERSPECTIVE TO WEAPON 
SYSTEM ACQUISITION 
Chapter II described the acquisition system and its formal hierarchical operating 
structure.  Chapter III introduced the network perspective and its basic assumptions and 
methodology.  This chapter draws on the data from the APAT process model and 
concludes that the acquisition system has network-like properties.  The implications of 
the acquisition system’s network characteristics are explored in terms of acquisition 
governance.  
1. Interdependencies between Actors 
One of the key characteristics of a network is the relationships between the actors.  
Interdependencies between actors is the basis for the formation of networks (Klijn, 1997) 
(Powell, 1990) (Jones, et. al., 1997).  The interdependencies are based on the exchange of 
resources, and where the actors need capital, personnel, and knowledge to accomplish 
their objectives (Klijn, 1997). 
To deliver a weapon system, numerous actors are involved, as Tables 5, 6, and 7 
synthesize for their respective acquisition phases.  One of the key interdependencies 
during the acquisition process is the exchange of knowledge between actors.  During the 
first three phases of the acquisition process, knowledge about what you need to buy and 
how the system should be designed to meet those needs is the focus of the activities.  As 
shown in Appendix A, Process 1.0, the outputs of the Concept Refinement phase include 
an approved Course of Action, identification of resources needed for the next phase, 
approved milestone decision documents, a signed acquisition decision memorandum, and 
a technology development strategy.  All of this knowledge is based on the collaborations 
among the stakeholders during each activity.  
Knowledge does not come free:  manpower and dollars are required to pay 
salaries, hire outside experts, travel to meetings, and facilitate many other activities.  
Early in the acquisition cycle, resources enable the building of knowledge about the 
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characteristics, technology, and design of the weapon system.  Later, resources buy 
materials that become the weapon with its spare parts, support equipment, and trained 
personnel that are required to deliver a capability. 
The interdependencies between actors for Concept Refinement are modeled in 
Figure 13.  For modeling purposes, the interactions are assumed to be two-way, directed 
collaborations.  The relationships are those that are specified in the Concept Refinement 
processes or may be inferred from the type of documents that are approved during that 
phase.  For example, approval of a Test Evaluation Master Plan for a large program 
requires an OSD (DOT&E) signature.  Of course, these are not the only relationships that 
a program might need to carry out the objectives of this phase of the acquisition cycle.  
This is a minimum set that one would expect to see for any major acquisition program.   
The diagram shown in Figure 13 illustrates the interdependencies required to 
define the weapon system concept, select the course of action, and prepare for the 
Technology Development phase.  As one could guess based on the description of 
responsibilities in JCIDS and the DoD 5000 series regulations, the lead acquisition 
organization program manager (node 4), the MAJCOM requirements organization (node 
2), and the milestone decision authority (node 5) have critical roles during this phase.  
Freeman's measure of degree centrality (1977) for those nodes is relatively higher 
indicating the probability that they will control resources in the network. 
Graphically, Figure 13 portrays the collaboration required with the other 22 actors 
to accomplish the outputs of this acquisition phase.  Individually, the lead acquisition 
organization, the MAJCOM requirements organization, and the milestone decision 
authority do not interface with all of the other actors.  The spreadsheet in Appendix B for 
the Concept Refinement interactions denotes the lead acquisition organization 
collaborating with 18 other actors.  Of the seven actors with which the lead acquisition 
organization does not interface, the program manager must rely on other organizations to 




Figure 13.   Concept Refinement Interdependencies 
 
Given a weapon system concept, the purpose of the Technology Development 
phase of the acquisition process is to mature key technologies and to plan for weapon 
system development.  These two activities require a diverse set of interdependencies.  
Maturing technology requires an in-depth understanding of the concept and system 
architecture as well as a diverse network of technology providers.  Furthermore, the 
program must define the capability needs in the CDD.  Along with the capability needs, 
operational, support, maintenance, and interoperability concepts must be refined so that 
the weapon system may be designed with these plans in mind.  The acquisition systems 
engineering, test, logistics, contracting, and financial management communities 
collaborate with the warfighters to translate concepts into an executable acquisition 
program. 
To understand these interactions, this analysis focuses on process 2.1.2 Identify 
Technologies for Maturation, process 2.1.3 Define Technology Maturation Plan, and 
process 2.5 Develop and Prepare Documents for Milestone B, which the APAT model 
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decomposed as noted in Appendix A.  The diagram of the interdependencies for this 
phase is illustrated in Figure 14, while the matrix-view is in Appendix B. 
The diagram in Figure 14 reveals that there are 28 actors involved in the 
acquisition program, an increase from the Concept Refinement phase.  Based on degree 
centrality, the lead acquisition organization/program manager (node 4) remains the most 
central actor, maintaining many of the relationships from the previous phase.  Likewise, 
the MAJCOM requirements organization (node 2) and the milestone decision authority 
(node 5) also maintain their central role.  A number of other actors at the OSD and 
service-level become more prominent, as demonstrated by their degree centrality.  The 
network relies on relationships with these actors to provide guidance and priorities that 
shape the program from an operational, acquisition strategy, and budget perspective.  
Therefore, the influence of the key actors is still great, but there are many relationships 
developing during this phase that are beyond the control of the key actors. 
Figure 14.   Technology Development Planning/Milestone Interdependencies 
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During the System Development and Demonstration phase, the critical activities 
include allocating requirements and developing a design, testing the design, and 
preparing for production and fielding of the system.  This analysis focuses on process 3.1 
Manage the Program and process 3.2.3 Develop Detailed Design from the APAT effort in 
Appendix A. 
The diagram in Figure 15 depicts a less dense, decentralized network.  In terms of 
degree centrality, the program manager (node 4) is still the most central actor, although 
the MAJCOM requirements organization (node 2) is now less central than the contractor 
(node 10) in influencing the network.  The rise of the contractor's centrality indicates the 
importance of the contractor’s information to the network in a monopolistic environment.  
This measure of centrality for the sole non-governmental actor is of interest to those who 
want to influence the outcome of the network at the community, network, and 
organizational levels of analysis. 
Figure 15.   System Development and Demonstration Interdependencies 
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2. Multiple, Independent Actors Formed around a Project 
Another characteristic of a network is that there is more than one actor who shares 
some common attribute that forms the context of their relationship.  Using the types of 
network relationships from Knoke and Kuklinski (1991), the actors involved in concept 
refinement would share several types of relationships.  Since information is a key 
resource, many relationships are communication relations.  Relationships with industry 
might be described in transactional terms, where dollars are expended so that resources 
can be utilized to help gather information on different acquisition concepts.  Finally, 
authority/power relations exist among the relationships.  Process 1.1 in Appendix A 
describes the controls on the process from the Congressional, OSD, and service level.  
These controls may be targeted specifically at a program, such as when Congress 
earmarks an appropriation for a specific program. 
One of the key questions is whether the actors remain independent to pursue their 
own objectives for the project.  As noted above, there are authority/power relations 
exerted on the program.  In fact, the lead acquisition organization program manager 
works for the service acquisition executive, typically through the PEO as an intermediate 
supervisor.  Many of the actors, however, do not work for one another.  Congress clearly 
does not work for the program manager, and the converse is also true.  In addition, key 
collaborators such as the MAJCOM and the lead acquisition organization do not work for 
one another even though they are in the same service.  If the lead acquisition organization 
and the MAJCOM requirements organization had a dispute, they would have to resolve it 
at the Chief of Staff of the Air Force/Secretary of the Air Force level.  As noted in 
Chapter II, issues are not resolved typically at that level.  Instead, the actors utilize their 
relationship with one another to collaborate and work through issues. 
3. Lasting, Stable Relationships between Actors  
The final characteristic to be analyzed is the pattern of relationships between 
actors over time.  Again, the literature stresses the importance of this characteristic based 
on the need to strengthen relationships (Klijn, 1997).  On long-term acquisition programs 
with both complexity and uncertainty, this characteristic is important to allow actors to 
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establish trust with one another.  This trust enables actors to make transaction-specific 
investments that will further the objectives of both the actors and the network. 
To examine this variable, the set of actors in the first three acquisition phases 
were analyzed to determine if the relationship spanned multiple acquisition phases, which 
could last from a couple of years to over a decade.  The analysis is inexact since only 
select processes from the Technology Development phase and System Development and 
Demonstration phase were analyzed.  Nonetheless, a group of 10 actors form 13 enduring 
relationships that span the formation and development of an acquisition program.  This 
group and their relationships are displayed in Table 8.  The network among this core 
group is graphically displayed in Figure 16. 
High degree centrality among this core group denotes the actors who continually 
control resources over time.  Not surprisingly, the program office has the highest degree 
centrality within this persistent group of core actors.  Interestingly, the MAJCOM budget 
organization and modernization budget integrator on Air Staff, SAF/AQX, also have high 
degree centrality stemming from their control over the fiscal resources needed to execute 
the acquisition program. 





























Requirements 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
(3) Program 




(MDA) 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
(5) Contractor 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
(6) MAJCOM 
Budget 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0
(7) SAF/AQX 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0
(8) Service Acq 
Exec 
(SAF/AQ) 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
(9) SAF/FM 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
(10) AF/XP 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
(11) Center 
Contracting 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0  
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B. NETWORK GOVERNANCE 
A network view of acquisition allows an analyst to look at outcomes and management 
strategies in a new way.  Rather than focusing on accountability, the focus shifts to 
understanding how to enable the network as a whole to create greater value.  As Provan 
and Milward (2001) suggested, the effectiveness of the network ought to be analyzed at 
the community, network, and participant level.  Understanding the outcomes desired from 
acquisition programs across the Congressional and warfighting community, the 
acquisition community, and the individual organizations within the network allows a 
holistic analysis of how the network ought to be structured to accomplish these desires. 
1. Network Performance 
A review of the data in Appendix B supports the conclusion that the Lead 
Acquisition Organization/Program Manager is the most central actor within the 
acquisition process in terms of degree centrality.  Furthermore, this actor has the greatest 
range of relationships, brokering information from the warfighter, budget community, 
technology community, and contractor.  This places the Program Manager in a very  
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important position in the network.  Of course, the Program Manager derives this 
centrality from his purported responsibility to deliver a weapon system within cost, 
schedule, and performance. 
Not all program managers perform equally.  Some may have networks that are 
unstable, and the manager is unable to stabilize them.  Other managers may have 
perfectly adequate networks but they are unable to understand their significance.   
Whatever the case, understanding the structure of the network should enable program 
managers to understand the environment within which successful programs are executed. 
Further, an understanding of the network allows an analysis of second-order 
effects due to changes in the network.  Provan and Milward (1995) concluded that 
resource scarcity would limit the effectiveness of any network.  When resources are 
adequate, however, factors such as centralization, direct external controls, and stability 
may also affect the outcomes of networks.  An understanding of the structure of the 
acquisition program network would allow an analysis of the effects of changes using 
modeling.  The resultant outcomes could be analyzed at the participant, network, and 
community level.  In other words, a network view of acquisition would allow individual 
participants to understand how their outcomes and the network's outcomes would be 
affected from the continuing change in policy, resources, and players in the acquisition 
system. 
2. Network Strategies for Weapon Systems 
If improved outcomes are desired at the community, network, and organization 
level, an understanding of the workings of the network should be accompanied by the 
ability to improve interactions within the network and possibly restructure the network.  
Several techniques that might be used to guide interactions within the structure of the 
acquisition network are suggested below. 
a. Guiding Interactions in the Acquisition Network 
Activating the network establishes actors who would push outcomes in a 
direction that the community desires.  JCIDS suggests that the community desires 
weapons systems that allow joint warfighting.  The process of using strategic guidance to 
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fund actors within the requirements and acquisition community who also value joint 
warfighting would allow the network to build a joint common purpose.  Furthermore, the 
key players in Table 8 and Figure 16 should support relationships with peripheral actors 
within the network that promote interoperability.  Those key players who broker 
resources within the network might be able to arrange interactions where actors who do 
not value joint outcomes are isolated and starved for resources. 
The core network actors would likely face conflict from other actors as 
they attempt to influence relationships across the network.  Facilitation, mediation, and 
arbitration would allow the core actors to constructively influence relationships in the 
network.  IPPD along with the IPT structure essentially encompass this behavior where a 
wide range of ideas are sought to solve network problems.  Further, consensus building 
within the network would be important, not only for the immediate solution but also to 
encourage continued interaction in the future. 
b. Restructuring the Acquisition Network 
Network theory is unclear on whether an actor, or even a coalition of 
actors, can affect all of the interactions across the network to pursue an objective.  Within 
the defense acquisition system, this theoretical debate is experienced quite often.  Then 
Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney attempted to kill the V-22 Osprey program.  Even as 
powerful an actor as the Secretary of Defense was unsuccessful.  Representative Curt 
Weldon reinserted the program in the appropriations bill, while the Marines were quietly 
advocating for the program. 
Nonetheless, the implementation of JCIDS provides an example of how to 
restructure the relationships in the network.  The value of jointness affects the 
interactions within the defense acquisition system.  Since the joint staff and the 
Functional Capabilities Boards control the requirements, the services that are not willing 
to play in a joint arena would not be in a position to become the sponsoring agency.  A 
set of social interactions has evolved under JCIDS that values joint weapon systems. 
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. CONCLUSIONS 
1. Research Question 
The focus of this professional report was to answer the following research 
question:  does the DoD weapon system acquisition process behave as a network? 
The characterization of the "Big A" acquisition system as a complex interaction of 
the JCIDS subsystem, the PPBE subsystem, and the defense acquisition subsystem 
identified multiple stakeholders who value different outcomes.  Each of these players 
attempts to utilize some form of hierarchy to break down tasks and assign responsibility 
to ensure task accomplishment.  Figure 2, Figure 3, and Figure 6 all display some of the 
key outputs and players within JCIDS, PPBE, and acquisition, respectively. 
However, the APAT process model revealed a more complex, interactive process 
among the JCIDS, PPBE, and the acquisition subsystems.  Table 2, Table 3, and Table 4 
portray the key players in the first three phases of the acquisition cycle.  An analysis of 
these players reveals that many do not work for one another and may have differing 
objectives.  Furthermore, examination of the key activities within the Concept 
Refinement, Technology Development, and System Development and Demonstration 
phases, and the interactions of the key players who were involved in the controls, inputs, 
activities, and outputs of each subsystem, revealed key interdependencies and long, stable 
relationships among independent actors.  This analysis led to the conclusion that weapon 
system acquisition can be conceptualized as a network. 
2. Further Refinements 
Analysis of the APAT process model data also led to an understanding that 
centrality is not equally distributed within the network.  The lead acquisition 
organizations/program manager is a central figure who has the greatest number of 
relationships and is most central to the network measured in terms of degree of centrality.  
Despite the program manager's lack of a high position within a hierarchical model, 
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network analysis reveals that the program manager has the greatest number of  
contacts and interactions within the network. 
Additionally, there is a core group of actors who have a persistent set of 
relationships during the early, critical stages of the acquisition process.  While the 
program manager is well-placed within this core group, there are other important actors 
who deal with budgets and have sustained relationships over time.  Understanding the 
structure of this group and their relationships with the rest of the network will be 
important in helping the program manager develop strategies to govern the network and 
influence changes for improved network performance and outcomes.  
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. Validate the Model 
First, the data gathered in the APAT model were intended to serve as a framework 
to understand the current acquisition process as it applies to a majority of programs.  The 
scope of the data gathering process limited the ability to focus on all interactions.  
Therefore, activities such as milestone decisions were described as an exercise in 
document writing.  Those involved in the APAT effort recognized that the documents 
generated for a milestone decision were actually the culmination of a set of interactions to 
gather data and develop a strategy for a particular portion of the acquisition program.  For 
this effort, the official who approved the document and the program office WIPT were 
assumed to be the only participants.  This is in fact probably not true.  Participants might 
include other organizations, depending on the subject matter of the program and local 
procedures. 
Therefore, the model serves as a good first step to begin to explore certain 
interactions within the acquisition system.  If a certain set of interactions or a set of actors 
are of interest, gathering more detailed data would be valuable to further the 
understanding of the network and validating the model. 
2. Network Framework to Study Improved Outcomes 
The data gathering effort for the APAT model was not prescriptive.  While the 
sponsors of the effort were interested in recognizing areas for improvement, the model 
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was meant to describe the current process.  There are reasons for the patterns of 
relationships established in the model, but there also may be improved ways of 
interacting. 
Indeed, the network model, once validated, could be utilized as a framework to 
assess program success.  Those who control acquisition policy or who participate in 
acquisition programs likely would be interested in studying how the networks of these 
programs of interest differ from the norm.  The DoD Directive 5000.1 gives the program 
manager and milestone decision authority flexibility to decide what the correct set of 
activities and relationships should be for a particular acquisition program.  Studying 
network models of similar programs might enable decision-makers to tailor their efforts 
and focus resources on valuable relationships.  Alternatively, acquisition strategies could 
be modeled to discover if information flows efficiently and effectively given several 
scenarios for organizing a program. 
3. Simulate Changes to the Acquisition System 
Of course, there are number of challenges within the acquisition process.  
Consistently delivering cost, schedule, and performance is rare as Augustine and Fabini 
(1983), Jones (1996), and McNutt (1998) agreed.  Improving consistency of the system 
has spawned a number of changes some of which are initially declared successful, only to 
be later discredited for their "unintended consequences."  An example is the initiative to 
give the contractor Total System Performance Responsibility.  This initiative gave the 
contractor more flexibility and responsibility for the performance of the acquisition 
program.  Unfortunately, the effects of this change were probably not studied using a 
network analysis.  The decision-makers acted upon the ideology that the marketplace 
solved all their problems. 
A number of changes to the acquisition system are being considered today.  
JCIDS mandates that programs have been have a Net-Ready Key Performance Parameter 
(CJCSI 3170.01E, 2005).  This attempt to build a communication system by mandating 
interoperability from those who will utilize the system is much like the chicken and the 
egg conundrum.  First, the architecture of the network must have some definition.  Those 
who are developing a network and the users of the network must collaborate to solve this 
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problem.  A network analysis to identify who is involved and how they are collaborating 
would be more beneficial rather than mandating a change and hoping that those actors in 
the network would comply. 
C. SUMMARY 
Networks describe both formal and informal ways of getting things done in the 
acquisition system.  The marketplace rarely delivers what the DoD needs at the quantity 
that it is needed.  Some commodities may be purchased in the marketplace, but the 
uncertainties associated with DoD needs do not allow firms to match their supply to 
demand.  Also, many of DoD's needs are based on interoperability between programs that 
must be defined before the market can react to this need.  The largest transactions, which 
involve the lion's share of the modernization budget, rely on the interactions between 
JCIDS, PPBE, and the acquisition system.  A hierarchy exists to account for the resources 
input into the process.  However, the complexities and dynamic nature of the process can 
best be described as a network of actors who use their relationships to affect outcomes. 
Would Glenn Curtiss recognize this network that delivers today's innovative 
stealth aircraft, advanced combat systems, and ships?  He probably would.  If you 
brought Mr. Curtiss into a meeting with a program manager, MAJCOM requirements 
officer, and a contractor, he would feel right at home.  Mr. Curtiss is no stranger to 
hierarchies given the size of the Curtiss Aircraft Company.  Nonetheless, he knew that 
innovation occurs when a network of collaborators shares ideas to solve their common 
problems. 
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